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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,

:
:

v.

:

ADAM NISH,

:

Defendant/Appellant.

Case No. 20010295-CA

Priority No. 2

:
BRIEF OF APPELLEE

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from a conviction for possession of methamphetamine, a third
degree felony, in violation of UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) (1998 & Supp. 2001).
This Court has jurisdiction of the appeal under UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (1996).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
1. Was a trooper's attempt to frisk defendant during the traffic stop
justified by a legitimate safety concern, under the totality of the circumstances,
including defendant's false report of a stolen truck, a suspicious bulge in
defendant's pocket, his non-compliance with the trooper's repeated requests to
remove his hands from his pockets, the inherent danger in any traffic stop
scenario?
A "bifurcated" review standard applies to this issue. Underlying fact findings are
reviewed deferentially, and reversed only for "clear error." See State v. Pena, 869 P.2d

932, 935-940 (Utah 1994). The court's conclusions of law are reviewed for correctness,
allowing some "measure of discretion^ as regards the application of legal standards to the
facts. Id.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
U.S. CONST, amend. IV.:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated,
and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant was charged with possession of methamphetamine within 1000 feet of
a school, a second degree felony, in violation of UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-37-8(l)(a)-(b), 8(4)(a)(ix), (c) (1998 & Supp. 2001), and possession of drug paraphernalia, a class B
misdemeanor, in violation of UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-37a-5 (1998 & Supp. 2001) (Rl-2).
Defendant moved to suppress the evidence (R29-30 (motion), R50-57 (memorandum))
(copies are contained in addendum A). Following an evidentiary hearing on 25 January
2001, the trial court denied the motion (Rl 15:24-26) (a copy of the transcript and oral
ruling is contained in addendum B).
Thereafter, pursuant to the parties' plea agreement, the paraphernalia charge was
dismissed and defendant entered a conditional plea to a reduced third degree felony
methamphetamine charge and was sentenced to an indeterminate statutory term of zero-
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to-five years at the Utah State Pnson (R71, 75) (Rl 15:27-28). The trial court suspended
defendant's prison term and placed defendant on a 36-month term of probation (R72).
Defendant timely appealed (R79).
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS1
On 10 July 2000 at approximately 9:40 a.m., Trooper McMann stopped defendant
on SR 201 in Tremonton, Utah, for running a stop sign and having no front plate
(Rl 15:3). Without being asked to do so, defendant immediately exited his vehicle and
ran toward the trooper in an "upset" and "excited" manner (Rl 15:4). Defendant told the
trooper that his truck just been stolen (Rl 15:4). Trooper McCann asked defendant to
step over to the sidewalk and advised defendant why he had been stopped {id.).
The trooper then asked about the purportedly stolen truck (id.). Defendant said
that he had argued with his girlfriend and that she took off in his truck: "At the point
where he was failing to stop at the stop sign, that's where he was coming up to Main to
try and see which way she had gone. She had turned eastbound" (id.). The trooper put
out an "attempt to locate" on the truck as possibly stolen, but dispatch advised Trooper
McMann that the truck was actually registered in defendant's girlfriend's name (id.).
Although defendant "had calmed down a little bit" since the initial stop, information that
the truck was registered in his girlfriend's name "made him more upset" (Rl 15:5).

l

The facts are stated in the light most favorable to the trial court's ruling denying
the motion to suppress. State v. Tetmeyer, 947 P.2d 1157, 1158 (Utah App. 1997).
3

Defendant said he needed to go and find his girlfriend (Rl 15:11). The trooper told
defendant that he understood his situation and that consequently, he would only give him
a warning for the stop sign violation: "You had an argument with your girlfriend. Til
give you a warning for the stop sign violation*' (id.). Defendant, however, continued to
be upset (id.). Trooper McMann "may have" written the warning at this point, but
probably had not given it to defendant (Rl 15:12-13).
Indeed, during the encounter the trooper had also observed a Camel cigarette pack
sticking out of defendant's right pants pocket and underneath that was a "large bulge"
that he feared could be a small weapon (Rl 15:5, 9). Trooper McMann suspected the
bulge "could have been a number of things," including "a small firearm, like a small
revolver or something, by just the size[:] But then again I didn't know what it was, just
that he kept putting his hands back in his pocket" (Rl 15:7). Trooper McMann
emphasized that he didn't "want to be hurt[,]" and "just want[ed] to make sure
[defendant] [didn't] have any weapons on him" (id.). Trooper McMann's concern about
the bulge increased as defendant "became more nervous and kept putting his hands back
in" his pockets (Rl 15:12).
The trooper had also noticed a marijuana tattoo on defendant's right shoulder
which reminded him that he had arrested defendant for marijuana five or six years earlier
(Rl 15:7, 11, 13). Concerned about the bulge in defendant's pocket, and the fact that
defendant had his hands in his pockets, the trooper asked defendant to remove them from
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his pockets (Rl 15:15). He also asked defendant about the marijuana tattoo and told
defendant that he remembered arresting him in 1994 or 1995 for marijuana (Rl 15:7, 11,
13). Consequently, the trooper asked defendant whether he had "anything" on him, or in
his car, and if was using drugs (Rl 15:7, 14). Defendant denied using drugs and said he
did not want the trooper to search his car (id.). Trooper McMann observed that,
"[defendant] started to get really nervous" (id.).
Specifically, defendant put his hands back in his pockets, even though the trooper
had just asked him to remove them (Rl 15:5-8). Defendant also "shift[ed] his weight
from one foot to the other[,] [h]e continued to look back and forth[,] [n]ot really avoiding
eye contact but not having a lot of eye contact with [the trooper]" (Rl 15:5). Based on
his prior experience, Trooper McMann believed defendant "was looking for a way to
walk around [him]"or to "escape" (Rl 15:5-6, 15-16), which defendant ultimately did:
With the bulge and his continuing to look around as if looking for an
escape route, his nervous appearance, kept putting his hands back in, I said
that for my safety-you're making me nervous. For my safety I want to
make sure you don't have any weapons on you. So I put my left hand in
the small of his back. I know in the report I put push, but it wasn't
forceful, just a guide to get him turned around so I could be behind him for
a safe Terry frisk. At that immediate point that's when he took off running
(Rl 15:6) (see also Rl 15:8 ("As soon as I put my hand on his back to turn him towards
the car, that's when he took off running. I didn't get a chance to do anything").

5

Trooper McCann apprehended defendant only "when he finally got to a fence that
he [could] not climb over" (Rl 15:31-32).: As the trooper approached, defendant threw
some items over the fence, which when retrieved, turned out to be a syringe and a
homemade light bulb used to consume methamphetamine (id.). Both items were tested
and found to contain methamphetamine (id.).
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Defendant has not marshaled the evidence supporting the trial court's ruling
upholding the attempted protective frisk and shown that it is inadequate to support the
ruling. Defendant's challenge to the trial court's ruling must be rejected on this ground
alone.
Even overlooking the failure to marshal here, however, Trooper McCann's
attempt to frisk defendant during the traffic stop was eminently reasonable, given the
totality of the circumstances confronting the trooper. Defendant behaved in an unusually
excitable manner from the outset of the encounter, and also falsely reported that his
girlfriend had stolen a truck that turned out to be registered in her name. Against this
backdrop, the trooper recalled, based on his observation of defendant's marijuana tattoo,
that he personally had previously arrested defendant for marijuana. The trooper also
observed a suspicious bulge in defendant's pocket which he feared may be a small

2

Events following defendant's flight were not adduced at the suppression hearing,
but were summarized by the prosecutor pursuant to defendant's conditional guilty plea
(R155:31-32).
6

weapon, and defendant refused to comply with the trooper's repeated requests to remove
his hands from his pockets. Given these circumstances, and the fact that all traffic stops
are recognized as inherently dangerous situations for law enforcement, the trial court
properly ruled that the attempted frisk constituted a legitimate safety precaution.
Defendant has not adequately briefed any possible challenge to the trooper's
questioning regarding his current use and possession of drugs; in any event, the
questioning was supported by articulable reasonable suspicion.
ARGUMENT
THE TROOPER'S ATTEMPT TO FRISK DEFENDANT DURING
THE TRAFFIC STOP WAS JUSTIFIED BY A LEGITIMATE
SAFETY CONCERN, UNDER THE TOTALITY OF THE
CIRCUMSTANCES, INCLUDING DEFENDANTS FALSE
REPORT OF A STOLEN TRUCK, A SUSPICIOUS BULGE IN
DEFENDANT'S POCKET, HIS NON-COMPLIANCE WITH THE
TROOPER'S REPEATED REQUESTS TO REMOVE HIS HANDS
FROM HIS POCKETS, AND THE INHERENT DANGER IN ANY
TRAFFIC STOP SCENARIO
The trial court found that during Trooper McMann's encounter with defendant,
defendant "repeatedly put his hand in the pocket where this object or bulge was," even
after Trooper McMann had "repeatedly told [him] to remove [it]" (Rl 15:25), add. B.
Defendant's disobedient conduct thus "[gave] the officer a justification for being nervous
or uneasy or concerned, because normally a person, once they've been told by the officer
once or twice don't do that, understands that they're not supposed to do that, that that's a
problem" (id.). The trial court further ruled that Trooper McMann had a "right to look
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out for his own personal safety," "whether issuing a traffic ticket or a warning or
anything else" (Rl 15:25-26), add. B.
Defendant challenges the trial court's ruling upholding the frisk, claiming that
Trooper McCann's concern about the bulge in his pocket and his prior marijuana arrest
did not give rise to a reasonable suspicion that he was armed or dangerous. Aplt. Br. at
3-5. Defendant's challenge fails to fully consider the totality of the circumstances
confronting the trooper and otherwise lacks merit.
Failure to Marshall. Indeed, defendant does not attempt to demonstrate clear
error in the trial court's findings regarding the attempted protective frisk. Aplt. Br. at 37. See State v. Moosman, 794 P.2d 475, 475 (Utah 1990) (holding that to show clear
error appellant must marshal all evidence supporting trial court's findings and
demonstrate that the evidence, including all reasonable inferences, is insufficient to
support the findings). See also Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(9) ("A party challenging a fact
finding must first marshal all record evidence that supports the challenged finding."). If,
as here, the appellant makes no attempt to marshal the evidence supporting the trial
court's ruling and to demonstrate its insufficiency, the appellate court "accepts the trial
court's findings as stated in its ruling." State v. Benvenuto, 1999 UT 60, at ^[13, 983 P.2d
556. See also Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exch., 817 P.2d 789, 800 (Utah 1991 (failure to
marshal evidence). Defendant's challenge to the trial court's ruling must be rejected on
this ground alone.
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Even overlooking defendant's failure to marshal here however, the trial court
properly upheld the attempted protective frisk.
The Fourth Amendment Standard: Reasonableness. The touchstone of [an]
analysis under the Fourth Amendment is always 'the reasonableness in all the
circumstances of the particular government invasion of a citizen's personal security.'"
Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 108-09 (1977) (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S.
1,19 (1968)). In other words, "[t]he Fourth Amendment is n o t . . . a guarantee against
all searches and seizures, but only against unreasonable searches and seizures." United
States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 681 (1985).
In evaluating the reasonableness of an investigative stop and detention as occurred
here, a dual inquiry applies. Id. The first question is "whether the officer's action was
justified at its inception," and the second is "whether it was reasonably related in scope to
the circumstances which justified the inference in the first place." Id. (quoting Terry, 392
U.S. at 20). See also State v. Lopez, 873 P.2d 1127, 1131-1132 (Utah 1994). As
defendant does not assert that the instant traffic stop was unjustified, the issue here is
whether Trooper McMann unreasonably extended the traffic stop when he attempted to
frisk defendant.
[It is well established that a "detention incident to a traffic stop 'must be
temporary and last no longer than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop.'"
Lopez, 873 P.2d at 1132 (quoting Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500 (1983)).
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Additionally, the length and scope of the stop must be "'strictly tied to and justified by'
the circumstances which rendered its initiation permissible[,]" id. (quoting Terry, 392
U.S. at 19-20)). However, "a valid investigatory stop may include 'a request for
identification and inquiry concerning the suspicious conduct of the person detained/'
Lopez, 863 P.2d at 1133 (quoting Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 700 n.12
(1981)). See also UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-7-15 (1995) ("A peace officer may stop any
person in a public place when he has a reasonable suspicion to believe he has committed
or is in the act of committing or is attempting to commit a public offense and may
demand his name, address and an explanation of his actions.")- This means that during a
routine traffic stop, police
may request a driver's license and vehicle registration, conduct a computer
check, and issue a citation. However, once the driver has produced a valid
driver's license and evidence of entitlement to use the vehicle, che must be
allowed to proceed on his way, without being subject to further delay by
police for additional questioning.
Lopez, 873 P.2d at 1132 (quoting State v. Robinson, 797 P.2d 431, 435 (Utah App.
1990)). In a routine traffic stop, "investigative questioning that further detains the driver
must be supported by reasonable suspicion of more serious criminal activity/' Id.
A reviewing court's after-the-fact assessment of any articulated reasonable
suspicion must take into account the "totality of the circumstances present at the time of
the stop to determine if there was an objective basis for suspecting criminal activity/'
State v. Rodriguez-Lopi, 954 P.2d 1290, 1292 (Utah 1998) (quoting State v. Humphrey,
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937 P.2d 137, 141 (Utah App. 1997)). As recently emphasized by the United States
Supreme Court, totality of circumstances review "allows officers to draw on their own
experience and specialized training to make inferences from and deductions about the
cumulative information available to them that 'might well elude an untrained person.'"
United States v. Arvizu,

U.S.

, 122 S.Ct. 744, 750-751 (2002) (quoting United

States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 418 (1981)).
Moreover, given the dangers inherent in all traffic stops, police are entitled to take
reasonable precautionary actions to ensure their safety during the course of a traffic
investigation. State v. James, 2000 UT 80,1J 10, 13 P.3d 576 (citing Mimms, 434 U.S.
at 110-111); State v. O'Brien, 959 P.2d 647, 649 (Utah App. 1998). See also United
States v. Holt, 264 F.3d 1215, 1225 (10th Cir. 2001) {en banc). Indeed, "[o]wing to
inherent safety concerns and the limited nature of the intrusion, officers may order the
occupants of a vehicle to leave the vehicle during the course of the investigation."
James, 2000 UT 80, Tf 10 (citing Mimms, 434 U.S. at 110-111).3 As further recognized
by the Utah Supreme Court, "[i]t is clear that the safety concerns guiding the Supreme
Court's decision in Mimms do not depend on any particular showing that an officer was

3

Recognizing the inherent danger in all traffic stops, the Tenth Circuit Court of
Appeals recently held that police may ask the occupants of a vehicle if they possess
loaded weapons, even in the absence of particularized suspicion that the occupants are
armed and dangerous. Holt, 264 F.3d at 1225.
11

at heightened risk due to the unique circumstances of a given automobile stop, . . . but
rather are of an inherent and general nature." James, 2000 UT 80, ^ 10 (citation omitted).
This Case. Notwithstanding the inherent danger, the usual motorist stopped for
traffic violations is not ordinarily subjected to an attempted protective frisk. Defendant,
however, was not the usual motorist. Immediately after being stopped, and without being
asked to do so, defendant left his vehicle and ran toward the trooper in an upset and
excited manner. Defendant then proceeded to falsely inform the trooper that his
girlfriend had just stolen his truck. Defendant's excitement escalated when the trooper
informed him that the truck was not registered in his name, but in the name of the
purported thief, defendant's girlfriend. Defendant did not calm down, even when the
trooper stated that he would only give him a warning for the stop sign violation. See
Statement of the Facts, supra.
Additionally, in the course of his interaction with defendant, Trooper McCann
observed a marijuana tattoo on defendant's shoulder, and recalled that he had previously
arrested defendant for marijuana in 1994 or 1995. The trooper also observed a large
bulge in defendant's right pants pocket, beneath a pack of Camel cigarettes which was
protruding from the pocket. The bulge raised a safety concern for Trooper McCann and
he asked defendant to remove his hands from his pockets. Defendant initially complied,
but then inserted his hands into his pockets over the trooper's repeated requests to
remove them. Defendant did not cease this behavior, even though the trooper told him it

12

was causing him to be concerned for his personal safety. Defendant's agitation increased
as the trooper questioned him about his prior arrest-defendant would not make direct eye
contact with Trooper McCann and shifted his weight from foot to foot. Trooper McCann
correctly anticipated that defendant was looking for an opportunity to flee, which
defendant did, when the trooper attempted to frisk him. See Statement of the Facts,
supra.
Trooper McCann's safety concern was both real and reasonable. As noted
previously, both the United States Supreme Court and the Utah Supreme Court recognize
the inherent danger facing police during traffic stops. In Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S.
408, 413 (1997), the Supreme Court observed that c[i]n 1994 alone, there were 5,672
officer assaults and 11 officers killed during traffic pursuits and stops." The Supreme
Court has previously noted that approximately 30% of police shootings occur when an
officer approaches a suspect seated in a vehicle. Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032,
1049 n.13 (1983); see also United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 234 n.5 (1973)
(FBI report indicates that 11 of 35 police officers murdered in a three-month period were
killed when the officers were making a traffic stop); 4 W. LaFAve, Search and Seizure, §
9.5(a), 254-255 n.33 (1996) (more officers are shot while conducting field interrogations
than while dealing with known felons, and 43% of officer shootings occurred pursuant to
a vehicle stop take place after the initial contact has been made). As tragically
highlighted by recent events in this state, Utah is not immune from the national trend.
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See Angie Welling, Officer's death shocks Lehi, Deseret News, August 5, 2001, at Al (a
copy is attached). See, e.g., State v. Colwell, 2000 UT 8,ffil2-5, 994 P.2d 177
(passenger in traffic stop shoots at officer after ignoring repeated requests to show his
hands); State v. Johnson, 784 P.2d 1135, 1137 (Utah 1989) (dnver shot at officer
without warning as officer approached vehicle). Thus, given the totality of the
circumstances here, Trooper McCann reasonably attempted to frisk defendant.
Defendant's attempts to analogize the instant frisk to those invalidated in State v.
Carter, 812 P.2d 460 (Utah App. 1991), cert, denied, 836 P.2d 1383 (Utah 1992), and
State v. White, 856 P.2d 656 (Utah App. 1993), are not persuasive. See Aplt. Br. at 5.
For example, Carter involved an investigation of drug smuggling at the airport. Id. at
466. This Court upheld the trial court's finding that "the officer's perception of a line
just at or above the defendant's waist, but under his outer clothing, did not give rise to
reasonable articulable suspicion" Carter was smuggling. Id. The Court observed that the
officer testified that it was his experience that drugs are often smuggled by taping them
to one's mid-section; however, the officer also testified that he "definitely didn't know
exactly what [the line] was," and it could just as likely have been ''shorts or something
else." Id. at 466 n. 6. Thus, giving appropriate deference to the trial court's ability to
determine that the "officer's preliminary suspicions were still more in the nature of a
hunch and had not risen to the requisite level of reasonable suspicion," and noting the
State did not challenge the finding, this Court declined to find any error therein. Id.
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Carter is thus not helpful here because it involves neither a traffic stop scenario with its
inherent dangers, nor a bulge reasonably suspected to be a small gun, as here. Indeed,
there is no indication that the officer in Carter ever suspected the "line" at Carter's waist
was anything other than drugs or clothing.
White is similarly unavailing as police observed no bulge in White's clothing,
merely that he was wearing a winter coat. Id. at 661. On appeal, this Court held that
"while the appearance of a suspicious bulge in the outer clothing of a suspect may be a
factor in indicating that the suspect might be armed, [] simply wearing a winter coat is
not." Id. (citation omitted). White thus, if anything, inferentially supports the State's
position here. Carter and White are therefore distinguishable from the circumstance in
which Trooper McCann found himself.
A more analogous case than either Carter or White, is State v. Rochelle, 850 P.2d
480, 483 (Utah App. 1993), where this Court upheld a protective frisk dunng traffic stop
based on the officer's observation of a similar "bulge" in Rochelle's pocket. See also
Stout v. State, 804 S.W.2d 686, 689 (Ark. 1991) (upholding protective frisk performed
to determine if "obvious bulge" in suspect's jacket was a weapon); United States v.
Barnes, 909 F.2d 1059, 1067 n.10 (7th Cir. 1990) (upholding protective frisk where
officer observed "heavy object" protruding from suspect's jacket pocket); 4 W. LaFave,
Search and Seizure, § 9.5(a) n.55-56 (1996 & Supp. 2002) (collecting cases and
observing that cases involving a "characteristic bulge in the suspect's clothing," or
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'"observation of an object in the pocket which might be weapon," are "[illustrative of the
circumstances which the courts have deemed sufficient" for a protective fnsk). As
further observed by this Court, "roadside traffic stops are particularly dangerous when
weapons may be present in the area immediately surrounding a suspect." State v.
Bradford, 839 P.2d 866, 869 (Utah App. 1992) (citation omitted). Trooper McCann
therefore reasonably attempted to frisk defendant and the trial court's ruling can be
upheld this ground.
In sum, given the totality of the circumstances here, particularly the suspicious
bulge in defendant's pocket and his repeated failure to comply with the trooper's requests
to remove his hands therefrom, Trooper McMann reasonably attempted to frisk
defendant during the traffic stop. As correctly observed by the trial court, Trooper
McMann had a "right to look out for his own personal safety," "whether issuing a traffic
ticket or a warning or anything else" (Rl 15:25-26), add. B. The trial court's sound
ruling should be upheld.
*

*

*

Failure to Comply With Briefing Rule. Defendant also challenged the propnety
of the trooper's drug-related questioning below, but does not specifically press this issue
in his appellate brief. See Aplt. Br. at 3-7. Indeed, defendant's broad challenge to the
scope of the traffic stop does not mention the questioning, let alone analyze it in any
meaningful manner. Id. He has therefore abandoned this argument on appeal.

16

Moreover, Rule 24(a)(9), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, requires an
appellant's argument to contain the "contentions and reasons of the appellant with
respect to the issues presented, including the grounds for reviewing any issue not
preserved in the trial court, with citations to the authorities, statutes, and parts of the
record relied on." Utah's appellate courts have consistently declined to address
inadequately brief issues because "a reviewing court is entitled to have the issues clearly
defined with pertinent authority cited and is not simply a depository in which the
appealing party may dump the burden of argument and research." State v. Bishop, 753
P.2d 439, 450 (Utah 1988) (quoting Williamson v. Opsahl, 416 N.E.2d 783, 784 (111.
App. 1981)); see also Burns v. Summerhays, 927 P.2d 197, 199 (Utah App. 1996).
Reasonable Suspicion to Further Detain. Even if the Court were to overlook
defendant's appellate waiver and inadequate briefing, the totality of the circumstances
confronting Trooper McCann reasonably gave rise to suspicion defendant might have
been using drugs, or had them on his person or in his vehicle. See Mimms, 434 U.S. at
108-09 (recognizing that the "touchstone"of Fourth Amendment law is
"reasonableness") (quoting Terry, 392,U.S. at 19)); Arvizu, 122 S.Ct. at 751
(recognizing reasonable suspicion is "somewhat abstract" concept and rejecting as sharp
departure from precedent circuit court's practice of evaluating in isolation from each
other factors contributing to reasonable suspicion).
Indeed, defendant behaved in an unusually excited and nervous manner from the
outset of the traffic stop when, without being asked to do so, he immediately exited his
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vehicle, ran toward the trooper, and falsely reported his truck had been stolen.
Defendant's agitation increased when the trooper informed him that the truck was in fact
registered in his (defendant's) girlfriend's name, and he did not calm down when the
trooper informed him he would only be warned for the stop sign violation. Moreover,
the trooper noticed a suspicious bulge in defendant's pants pocket and defendant failed
to comply with trooper's repeated requests that he remove his hands from his pockets,
even when informed that his behavior was causing the trooper to fear for his safety.
Defendant would not make direct eye-contact with the trooper and shifted his and weight
from foot to foot, and otherwise behaved as if he was about to flee, which he ultimately
did. Finally, the marijuana tattoo on defendant's shoulder triggered the trooper's
memory that he personally had arrested defendant for marijuana approximately five or
six years earlier. See Statement of Facts, supra.
Defendant's cursory assertion that his prior marijuana arrest should not be
considered in the reasonable suspicion calculus is simply mistaken. Humphrey, 937
P.2d at 143 (recognizing that information regarding an individual's prior criminal
activity is a factor in determining reasonable suspicion). Further, while no one of the
above factors is alone sufficient to establish reasonable suspicion defendant was using or
in possession of drugs, viewed as a totality, they justify the trooper's drug-related
inquiries here. Id. (recognizing that while "past criminal activity, nervousness, anger,
and traveling back from a known drug community'did not individually support
reasonable suspicion, they did in combination). See also State v. Chevre, 2000 UT App
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6, m 11, 994 P.2d 1278 (recognizing that defendant's "extreme nervousness" properly
lead the officer to believe that he was involved in "more serious criminal activity"),
Laime v. State\ 60 S.W.3d 464, 474 (Ark. 2001) (holding reasonable suspicion of drug
trafficking legitimately entertained based in part on defendant's misrepresentation
regarding a prior drug conviction and his "ever-increasing agitation"). The trial court's
ruling should thus be upheld.
CONCLUSION
This Court should affirm both the trial court's ruling denying the motion to
suppress and defendant's third degree felony conviction.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED on 5~~February 2002.
MARKL.SHURTLEFF
Utah Attorney General

&ARIAN DECKER
/Assistant Attorney General
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RICHARD M. GALLEGOS - #8189
Box Elder County Public Defender
3856 Washington Blvd.
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IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF
BOX ELDER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

*
*

vs.

*

ADAM NISH,

*

Defendant

MOTION TO SUPPRESS

*

Case No. 001100423
Judge: BEN HADFIELD

COMES NOW, Defendant, Adam Nish, by and through his attorney of record,
Richard M. Gallegos, and hereby moves this Court to Suppress, based upon the following
reasons:
1 Trooper John McMahon exceeded the scope of the circumstances justifying the stop
WHEREFORE, Defendant respectfully request the improperly obtained evidence be
Suppressed. An accompanying Memorandum will be filed no later than October 25, 2000.
DATED this2l) day of October, 2000.

RICHARDS! GALLEGOS
Attorney for Defendant

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I mailed and faxed a true and correct copy of the foregoing Motion to
Suppress,firstclass, postage prepaid, on this Jf

day of October, 2000, to the following

Jon J Bunderson
Box Elder County Attorney
45 North 100 East
Brigham City, Utah 84302

Secretary

Dale M. Dorius #0903
Justin C. Bond #8047
Attorneys at Law
PO Box 895
29 South Main
Brigham City, Utah 84302
(801) 723-5219 Phone
(801) 723-5210 Fax
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IN THE FIRST DISTRICT COURT, BOX ELDER COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

)

STATE OF UTAH
Plaintiff

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF
MOTION TO SUPPRESS

]

vs.
ADAM NISH
Defendant

>

Case No

001100423

1

Judge: Ben H Hadfield

]

COMES NOW Defendant, by and through counsel, and hereby submits the following
memorandum in support of Defendant's Motion to Support.

FACTS
1 On July 10, 2000 at 9 40 am the officer was westbound on SR 102 in Tremonton He
observed a vehicle coming from the North and noticed the vehicle failed to yield at a stop sign.
The officer further noticed the driver was not wearing a seat belt The officer affected a traffic

stop

^ pM* -

-UJ
1

2. Defendant exited the vehicle and approached the officer Defendant was upset and
excited. He stated his truck had been stolen by his girlfriend The officer states that Defendant
was excited and angry but was cooperative
3 The officer inquired about the stolen vehicle and learned Defendant's girlfriend's name
was on the registration of the truck. The officer told Defendant it could not be stolen since her
name was on the registration.
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4. At this point the officer states he noticed a prominent bulge in Defendant's right front
pocket. The officer further states he could see a ifack of camel cigarettes at the top of the pocket
but there was something larger underneath.

)([

J L L/* ^ pdU ,*f*U(, a*U L ^ ' ^

5. Defendant stated he needed to go find his girlfriend before she left for Ogden. The
officer stated he would give Defendant a warning for the stop sign.

^

6. At this point, the officer states he noticed a tattoo on Defendant's shoulder The
Officer also remembered arresting Defendant for a drug charge in 1994 or 1995. The officer then
asked Defendant if he still used drugs. Defendant stated no.
7. The officer then asked if he could search Defendant's car. Defendant stated no, "I
don t want you looking in my car.

4

,

8. The officer then states he became concerned for his safety due to the Defendant putting
his hands in his pockets where the officer had earlier noticed the bulge. The officer then put his
hand on the small of Defendant's back to push him toward the police car so terry frisk could be
performed.. Defendant fled from the officer. Defendant was caught shortly after.
9 Several items of an alleged controlled substance were found.

2

MEMORANDUM
Defendant contends the officer exceeded the scope of the stop in the present action.
Defendant further argues the officer did not have probable cause to request a terry frisk on
Defendant.
It is well settled that once an officer effectuates a traffic stop, the detention 'must be
temporary and last no longer than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop.
In State v. Chevre. 994 P.2d 1278, (Utah App. 2000) the Utah Appellate Court held
"Once a traffic stop is made, the detention 'must be temporary and last no
longer than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop.'" > Lopez, 873
P.2d at 1132 (quoting > Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500, 103 S.Ct 1319,
1325, 75 L.Ed.2d 229 (1983)). If there is investigative questioning that detains the
driver beyond the scope of the initial stop, it "must be supported by reasonable
suspicion of more serious criminal activity. Reasonable suspicion means suspicion
based on specific, articulable facts drawn from the totality of the circumstances
facing the officer at the time of the stop." > Id. If the officer reasonably suspects
more serious criminal activity, "the scope of the stop is still limited." > Id. The
officer must "diligently pursue[ ] a means of investigation that [is] likely to confirm
or dispel [his or her] suspicions quickly, during which time it [is] necessary to
detain the defendant." > State v. Grovier, 808 P.2d 133, 136 (Utah Ct.App.1991).
994 P 2d 1278, State v. Chevre, (Utah App. 2000)
Excerpt from pages 994 P 2d 1280-994 P.2d 1281

In the present action, the key to determining whether reasonable suspicion existed based
on the officer's statement about the bulge in Defendant's pocket and the officer's fear for his
safety, and the officer's claim he had arrested the Defendant back in 1994 or 1995 for a drug
violation, is by a close reading of relevant case law regarding each of the three statements by the
officer justifying the search.
First, regarding the bulge in Defendant's pocket, the Utah Appellate Court in State v.
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Carter. 707 P.2d 656, (Utah 1985) held
In Terry, the Supreme Court established a narrowly drawn exception to the Fourth
Amendment requirement that police obtain a warrant for all searches. Where a
police officer validly stops an individual for investigatory or other purposes and
reasonably believes that the individual may be armed and dangerous, the officer
may conduct a "frisk" or "pat-down" search of the individual to discover weapons
that might be used against him. "The officer need not be absolutely certain that the
individual is armed; the issue is whether a reasonably prudent man in the
circumstances would be warranted in the belief that his safety or that of others was
in danger." > 392 U.S. at 27, 88 S.Ct. at 1883. See also > Adams v. Williams,
407 U.S. 143, 92 S.Ct. 1921, 32 L Ed.2d 612 (1972), > Sibron v. New York, 392
U S. 40, > 88 S.Ct. 1889, 20 L.Ed.2d 917 (1968); > State v. Cole, Utah, 674 P.2d
119 (1983); > State v. Rocha, Utah, 600 P.2d 543 (1979); > State v. Lopes,
Utah, 552 P.2d 120 (1976).
> [2]> [3]> [4] The reasonableness of afriskfor weapons is judged by an
objective standard. > 1 It is not essential that an officer actually have been in fear.
See > United States v. Tharpe, 536 F.2d 1098, 1101 (5th Cir. 1976). Since no one
factor is determinative of reasonableness, a trial judge must determine the
reasonableness of afriskin light of all the facts. See > State v. Houser, Utah, 669
P.2d 437, 439 (1983). There must, however, be some reasonable basis for both
stopping and frisking; the officer "must be able to point to specific and articulable
facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably
warrant that intrusion." > 392 U.S. at 21, 88 S.Ct. at 1879. A mere
unparticularized suspicion or hunch is not sufficient.
707 P 2d 656, State v. Carter, (Utah 1985)
Excerpt from page 707 P.2d 659

In the present action, a mere bulge in Defendant's pocket does not rise to the level of a
reasonable belief the Defendant was armed or dangerous. The bulge in Defendant's pocket could
have been anything. There is nothing in the officer's police report detailing what the bulge may
have appeared to be to the officer. As the Court stated in State v. Rochellr 850 P 2d 480 (Utah
App. 1993)
The officer must justify a pat down search by "specific and articulable facts
which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant
4

that intrusion." > Terry, 392 U.S. at 21, 88 S.Ct. at 1880.
850 P.2d 480, State v. Rochell, (Utah App. 1993)
Excerptfrompage 850 P.2d 483

Merely stating there is a bulge in a suspects pockets is not a specific and articulable fact.
In RochelL the Trial Court made the following findings
The court made the followingfindingsregarding the objective facts relied
upon by Maycock tofriskRochell: That Rochell had been speeding, he had been
drinking and driving, his companion had also been drinking, Rochell had been
driving with an open container of alcohol in thefrontseat of the car, Rochell had
been speeding, that upon being stopped, Rochell left his vehicle and walked toward

the officer, Rochell had a bulge in his pocket, the officer believed the bulge could
have been a weapon.\> 2 and, when asked whether he had any weapons, Rochell
"was hesitant in answering no,"
850 P.2d 480, State v. Rochell, (Utah App. 1993)
Excerpt from page 850 P.2d 483

Again, in the present action, there are no specific and articulable facts about the bulge.

In State v, Sykes. 840 P.2d 825,(Utah App. 1992) (quoting State vT Carter) the Utah
Appellate Court held
In > State v. Carter, 812 P.2d 460, 466 (Utah App. 1991), cert, denied, >
836 P.2d 1383 (Utah 1992), narcotics officers observed defendant deplaning from
a flight arrivingfromLos Angeles, acting in a manner thought to be indicative of a
drug carrier. The officers stopped defendant, identified themselves, and asked to
examine his bag and to conduct a pat-down search of defendant's person. This
court held that the encounter became a level two seizure at this point, if not
sooner, and agreed with the trial court's findings that there was no reasonable
suspicion of criminal activity. The trial court noted that the bulge under

defendant's clothing at waist level and his failure to produce identification were
inadequate circumstances for the officers to have formed a reasonable articulable
suspicion. > Id. at 466-67.
840 P.2d 825, State v. Sykes, (Utah App. 1992)
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Excerpt from page 840 P 2d 828

Finally, Utah Courts have noted that the nature of the crime is relevant in determining
whether a terryfriskis justified. In State v. White. 856 P 2d 656 (Utah App 1993) the Utah
Appellate Court stated
Utah courts have also noted the significance of the nature of the suspected
crime on therightto conduct an immediatefriskof a suspect. See > State v
Carter, 707 P 2d 656, 660 (Utah 1985); > State v Strickling, 844 P 2d 979, 984
(Utah App 1992) Specifically, the > Carter court authorized the automatic frisk
of a burglary suspect because the officer could reasonably believe that a burglar
might carry dangerous tools or weapons in anticipation of strenuous objection
from an intended victim. > Carter, 707 P 2d at 660.

>FN9 Certain Supreme Court justices, state judges, and commentary have
questioned, however, whether suspicion of less violent criminal activity should
justify an immediatefriskin the absence of circumstantial evidence supporting the
possibility that a suspect is armed and presently dangerous. > Sibron, 392 U S at
73-74, 88 S Ct at 1907 (Harlan, J concurring). See also > State v Chapman, 841
P 2d 725, 730-32 (Utah App. 1992) (Orme, J. dissenting) (arguing that the
violation of a loitering ordinance created an insufficient suspicion of danger to
automatically justify a frisk). However, State v Hubbard, No. 910718-CA, slip
op at 3 (Utah App. Aug. 27, 1993), noted that "the nature of the intrusions may
differ when a stop to investigate past criminal behavior is involved," because a stop
based on a past crime does not necessarily have the same governmental interests as
one pertaining to a potential immediate crime.
> FN 10 While the > Greene court decided that police officers could respond
immediately to a domestic violence call by entering the dwelling where a domestic
incident was allegedly occurring, it did not discuss whether an alleged suspect
could automatically be frisked. > Id. Approving the immediate response of
entering the site of an alleged domestic incident does not constitute authority to
conduct automatically afriskin the absence of any indication that the domestic
incident was ongoing or any evidence that the parties present were those involved
in the alleged dispute.

> FN11 LaFave suggested that, with the exception of drug dealing, suspicion of
drug related offenses should only require afriskwhen other circumstances
indicative of arms possession or danger are present See LaFave, § 9 4(a) at 507
6

(discussing possession of small amounts of marijuana or liquor, and trafficking in
small amounts of narcotics as circumstances authorizing frisk only in presence of
other relevant circumstances).

856 P.2d 656, State v. White, (Utah App. 1993)
Excerpt from page 856 P.2d 666_

In the present action, Defendant was stopped for a mere traffic violation. No other
indication of criminal behavior was present.
Second, regarding Defendant's past criminal history, the Utah Appellate Court in State v.
Humphrey, 937 P.2d 137(Utah App. 1997) held
Nervous behavior in the presence of police officers, alone, is also not enough. See
> Potter, 860 P.2d at 957; > State v. Lovegren, 829 P 2d 155, 158 (Utah

Ct.App. 1992). In addition, the fact an individual previously has been involved in
criminal activity is also not enough. We recognize that consideration of an
individual's past criminal history is not properly part of the probable cause
determination See > State v. Brooks. 849 P 2d 640. 644 (Utah Ct. App. 1993)

(stating information that defendant had been target of past drug investigations not
considered in determining probable cause of current possession of controlled
substances).
937 P.2d 137, State v. Humphrey, (Utah App. 1997)
Excerpt from page 937 P.2d 143

The officers statement that he had arrested Defendant previously, almost five or six years
previously, should not be used a determination of suspicion as stated in Humphrey.
WHEREFORE, Defendant moves the suppress the evidence in the above action.
>

DATED this 7^

day of January, 2001.

^
JUSTIN C BOND
Attorney at Law
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BOX ELDER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,

)
Plaintiff,

)
)

vs. .

) Case No. 001100423
) Transcript of Videotape
)

ADAM G. NISH,

)

Defendant.

)

Transcript of Motion to Suppress and Arraignment.
Honorable Ben H. Hadfield presiding.
First District Court Courthouse
Brigham City, Utah
January 25, 2001

APPEARANCES:
For the Plaintiff:

ROGER F. BARON
Deputy County Attorney

For the Defendant:

JUSTIN C. BOND
Attorney at Law

RODNEY M. FELSHAW
Registered Professional Reporter
First District Court
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C M CZP\
P. 0. Box 373
...nLtU
Brigham City, UT 34302-0373
Utah Court of Appeals
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THE CLERK:

Case numcer 001100423, State cf ::an

versus Adam Nish.
THE COURT:

Counsel, I apologize for the delay.

I

was in a meeting this morning and when I got out it was 11
and the clerk advised me that Mr. Bond had filed this
memorandum at about ten.

I wanted to at least skim through

it before we started the hearing.
the file sitting on my desk.

As a result of that I left

The clerk will have it back in

here in a moment.
MR. BARON:
Mr. Gallegos.
saw it.

The actual motion was filed long ago by

He was going to file a memorandum.

I never

I mentioned that to Mr. Bond and asked if he would

file something so I had more of an idea what they were
claiming.

I appreciate him filing that.

I don't know that it will be necessary to file a
responsive memorandum.

I would just ask at the end of the

hearing, if the court desires me to do so, I would be happy
to do that, but I doubt it will be necessary.
THE COURT:

Okay.

As to the facts, Mr. Baron,

you've gone through Mr. Bond's recitation of the facts.

Are

there some of those that are in dispute?
MR. BARON:
the officer here.

They're just net complete.

I do have

I think we can -- I think what the

essential issue is going to be is whether there were specific
and articulable facts justifying the frisk.

I think we can

do that in a few minutes, put on that much of the testimony.
THE COURT:

Ail right.

Go ahead and call your

MR. BARON:

Call John McMann.

witness.

JOHN MCMANN,
being first duly sworn, was examined and
testified as follows:
DIRECT EXAMINATION
BY MR. BARON:
Q.

Tell us your name, please.

A.

John McMann.

Q.

And you're a trooper with the Utah Highway Patrol, is

that correct?
A.

I am.

Q.

Today we're talking about something that occurred back

July, July 10th, about 9:40 in the morning."

m

You were out in

the Tremonton area and I'm going to lead you through the
unimportant business here.

As you were patrolling you saw a

vehicle that failed to yield to a stop sign.

You also

noticed that the vehicle had no license plate, so you made a
traffic stop of the vehicle.

Do you recall that occurring?

A.

I do.

It didn't have a plate on the front.

Q.

Okay.

Didn't have a plate on the front.

Immediately

after the traffic stop the defendant, Mr. Nish, gets out ana
heads back to your vehicle.

He appears to be upset and

excited, is that correct?
A.

He was.

When he got out of the vehicle he approached me

rather quickly.
Q.

And he appeared to be upset and excited at that point?

A.

He was.

Q.

And let's get more detail at this point.

I understand he

wanted to report to you a vehicle being stolen?
A.

Yeah.

He ran back to my car.

He appeared to be very

upset.

He stated that his girlfriend had just stolen his

truck.

I asked him to step back and over towards the

sidewalk.

I advised him why I had stopped him.

what had just occurred.

I asked him

He said he had had an argument with

his girlfriend and she got into his truck and took off.

At

the point where he was failing to stop at the stop sign,
that's where he was coming up to Main to try and see which
way she had gone.

She had turned eastbound.

I got the information on the truck, contacted dispatch
and advised them to put out an attempt to locate on the
vehicle for possibly being stolen.

A short time later they

advised me that the truck was actually registered to his
girlfriend's name.
Q.

When you informed Mr. Nish of that what was his response?

A.

He had calmed down a little bit at that point.

I told

him that due to the fact she was the registered owner he
couldn't report it stolen.

That made him more upset.

Q.

And then what happened?

A.

While standing by the rear of the vehicle I explained ::•

him I understand your situation.
your girlfriend.

You had an argument with

I'll give you a warning for the stop sign

violation.
While standing there talking to him he still appeared
upset.

He appeared outwardly nervous, shifting his weight

from one foot to the other.
forth.

He continued to look back and

Not really avoiding eye contact but not having a lot

of eye contact with me.

From my experience it appeared like

he was looking for a way to walk around me or a way to leave.
Q.

Did you notice anything as far as -- you mention in your

report his pockets?
A.

Yes.

While standing there talking to him he had his

hands in his pockets.

I just asked him -- because he was

upset, appeared to be nervous to me.

This is after I asked

him about the tattoo and the previous drug arrest I had with
him years ago, and if he had anything in his vehicle.

While

standing there he had a Camel cigarette pack sticking out of
his right pants pocket.

I could see the top of it.

Underneath that was a large bulge.
in his pockets.

He kept putting his hands

I asked him to take his hands cut.

He

continued to appear nervous and looking back and forth.
put his hands back in his pockets.

He

Again I asked him to keep

his hands out of his pockets for my safety.

Q.

You indicate that at the time ne was putting his nanas ::.

his pockets and taking them out, was he upset at that point?
A.

He was.

Q.

Okay.

Was he upset at you or the system or what was he

upset over?
A.

I think at the situation with his girlfriend, is the best

I could tell.

And the fact that I was asking him questions

in reference to a previous drug arrest and if he had anything
on him or in his vehicle.
Q.

So a combination of he's upset with his girlfriend, he

doesn't like the questions you're asking.

Was he upset

because you weren't going to go pick up the vehicle?
A.

Initially I believe that's why he was upset.

Q.

And then what happens, after you told him a couple of

times to take his hands out of his pockets?
A.

With the bulge and his continuing to look around as if

looking for an escape route, his nervous appearance, kept
putting his hands back in, I said that for my safety -you're making me nervous.

For my safety I want to make sure

you don't have any weapons on you.
the small of his back.

So I put my left hand

m

I know in the report I put push, but

it wasn't forceful, just a guide to get him turned arcuna s:
I could be behind him for a safe Terry frisk.

At that

immediate point that's when he took off running.
Q.

He took off running?

A.

Took off running to my right and eastbound on M a m

Street.
Q.

Let's talk more about this bulge in his pocket.

Are

there any weapons that you know of that would have been the
size of that bulge that you saw in his pocket?
A.

The size could have been a number of things, but it could

have been a small firearm, like a small revolver or
something, by just the size.

But then again I didn't know

what it was, just that he kept putting his hands back in his
pocket.
Q.

It certainly could have been a weapon that he could have

used against you?
A.

That's what I initially thought, you know, because of his

nervousness.
weapon.

For my safety that's what I'm thinking is

I don't want to be hurt.

I just want to make sure

he doesn't have any weapons on him.
Q.

During what period of the conversation was he looking

around like he's looking for a way to get out of the
situation or to leave?
A.

When I started asking him about the tattoo on his arm.

I

said I think I remember arresting you in 1994 or '95 for
marijuana, something like that.
now, do you use drugs now.

Do you have anything on you

At that point that's when he

started to get real nervous.
Q.

Okay.

And then later, after he runs, you find some drugs

and obviously we know at this point wny he was nervous?
A.

Yes.

Q.

But at that point you didn't know the reason, but you

felt nervous enough yourself, uncertain enough, that you felt
a Terry frisk was in order?
A.

Yes, because of his outwardly nervous indications, kept

putting his hands back in his pocket.

For my safety, to make

sure I didn't get hurt, that's why I wanted to perform the
Terry frisk.
Q.

When he first put his hands in his pockets and you asked

him to take them out, did you say please don't put your hands
in your pockets so he knew he wasn't supposed to continue to
do that?
A.

Yeah.

What I usually say is just keep your hands out of

your pockets, for me.
Q.

So keep your hands out of your pockets?

A.

Yes.

Q.

At the time he kept putting them in?

A.

After a short period, yes, he put his hands back in his

pockets.
Q.

Okay.

I said keep your hands out of your pockets.
You didn't really get a chance to do any kind of

frisk on him at all?
A.

No.

As soon as I put my hand on his back to turn him1

towards the car, that's when he took off running.
get a chance to do anything.

I didn't

MR. BARON:

No further questions.

THE COURT:

Cross-examine.
CROSS-EXAMINATION

BY MR. BOND:
Q.

Let's see.

How long was it between the initial time yc\

pulled him over and the time you started to do the Terry
frisk?
A.

Without having a log, I would just guesstimate

probably -- talking to dispatch, probably between five, ten
minutes.
Q.

Somewhere between five and ten minutes.

Now, when you

first saw the defendant walk up to your car did you notice
this bulge in his pocket?
A.

I wasn't really looking at it at that time.

I was more

looking at his face and hands as he was walking back to me.
Q.

So at what point did you first notice the bulge?

A.

When I'm standing there with him by the back of the car

talking to him about the stolen vehicle.
Q.

And there are things that happened after that, correct?

I mean, there were things that happened after that but p n o :
to the Terry frisk, right?
A.

In reference to what?

Q.

Well, you saw the bulge in his pocket and then some oth~

things transpired and then you did the Terry frisk, isn't
that right?

A.

Things transpired as rar as my observations or what was

said? \
Q.

Conversations with him and things like that.

A.

Well, noticing the bulge was more when he kept putting

his hands back in his pocket.

When I started talking to him

after he started to appear more upset and nervous.

More

upset that he couldn't report it stolen and nervous as far as
the questions I was asking.
Q.

But when you saw the bulge in his pocket you didn't

immediately do the Terry frisk at that point, did you?
A.

No.

That's when I continued to tell him to keep his

hands out of his pocket.
Q.

You have in your police report "at this point I noticed a

prominent bulge in Nish's right front pants pocket."

And

then you indicate that he made some statements, right?
A.

Where are you reading?

Q.

Just before -- the bottom of the fourth paragraph.
MR. BARON:

At the bottom or the top of the fourth

paragraph?
MR. BOND:

The bottom.

fourth actual paragraph.
Q.

(BY MR. BOND)

"Jot number four, it's the

It's actually paragraph three.

Do you see that?

A.

The bottom of number three?

Q.

Yeah.

A.

I was looking at number four.

(Pause.)

Yeah, that's

when I noticed tne prominent bulge, tne cigarette pack
sticking out the top.
Q.

So you noticed a prominent bulge in his front pants

pocket, correct?
A.

Correct.

Q.

And then he made a statement that he needed to go find

his girlfriend, correct?
A.

Correct.

Q.

And then you said that you were just going to give him a

warning for the stop sign and let him go, correct?
A.

Correct.

Q.

And then you asked him if -- you told him that you

remembered arresting him in '94, '95, correct?
A.

Correct.

Q.

And then you pointed to the marijuana tattoo on his right

shoulder, right?
A.

Correct.

Q.

And then he started to put his hands back in his pockets

and things like that?
A.

Correct.

Q.

So how much time is there between the time you first

noticed the bulge in his pocket and when you actually tried
to perform the Terry search?
A.

Probably 30 seconds to a minute.

Q.

All right.

And when you initially saw this bulge, that

didn't raise your suspicious aoout any weapons, isn't that
true?
A.

When I initially saw the bulge?

Q.

Yeah.

A.

No.

When he became more nervous and kept putting his

hands back in is when it made it more of a concern to me.
Q.

So it was the bulge and putting his hand in.

Did he t:

to pull something out of his pocket?
A.

No.

Just putting his hand in there.

Q.

So just putting his hands in his pockets is all he was

doing?
A.

I don't know what his intentions were.

Q.

Now, tell me about the warning.

Were you just going tc

write him a warning or did you just tell him this is a
warning, you can go now?
A.

I was going to write a warning.

Q.

You were going to write him a ticket?

A.

No.

Q.

I mean a warning ticket.

A warning.
You were actually going to

write it down?
A.

Correct.
So -But we have our actual warning form.
And you hadn't written that out yet?
I believe I may have.

It's not a

Q.

Did he have it?

A.

No.

Q.

So it was still in your book?

A.

Probably.

Q.

So the real reason -- okay.

important.

I don't remember that part.
What you can remember is

Can you remember if you gave him the warning

ticket or not?
A.

I was probably holding onto it with his license and

registration.
Q.

So the real reason you didn't give that back to him is

because suddenly you remembered that you arrested him for a
drug charge and you wanted to inquire about whether or not he
still uses drugs, is that right?
A.

That's the reason I didn't give it to him?

Q.

Yeah.

Why didn't you give him the warning ticket and let

him go right then?
A.

I just wanted to talk to him about those -- the previous

arrest.

At this time —

simultaneously.
Q.

this is all happening

He continues to appear more nervous to me.

But you're not concerned for your safety here?

You're

asking about drugs, right?
A.

At that point yeah, I asked him about the tattoo.

Q.

So at the point --

A.

At that point I had remembered arresting him or giving

him a ticket in '94, '95.

Q.

So it wasn't until you started to ask about tne drug

charges and pointing to the mari]uana tattoo on his shoulder
that he began to get nervous and then you got concerned,
correct?
A.

Yes.

Not as much upset about the girlfriend taking the

truck, but more nervous about the questions I was asking.
Q.

All right.

And then the reason you didn't give him the

warning and the registration and his license back is that you
wanted to ask him about whether he still used drugs, right?
A.

No.

Ifve handed those back to people before and then

asked them questions.

I couldn't tell you what I was

thinking at that exact point.
Q.

All right.

A.

Sometimes I hold onto it while I'm asking them and

sometimes I hand it back.
Q.

In fact, you asked him that question if he still used

drugs and he said no, correct?
A.

Correct.

Q.

And then you asked him if you could search his car,

right?
A.

I asked him if he had anything in his car.

Q.

Quoting from your police report, "I asked him if he had

any opposition to me looking in his vehicle"?
A.

Correct.

Q.

And he said no, I don't want you looking in my vehicle?

A.

Correct .

Q.

And then right after that you say -- then you say "at

this point I was concerned for my safety due to the prominent
bulge in his front pocket, that it may be a weapon," correct?
A.

That and he kept putting his hands back in his pockets at

that point.
MR. BOND:

All right.

MR. BARON:

That's all I have.

Just a couple of follow up.
REDIRECT EXAMINATION

BY MR. BARON:
Q.

Officer, as Mr. Bond was questioning you he skipped a few

sentences there.

He's got the defendant saying no, I don't

want you looking in my car.
anything on him.
pockets.

He added that he didn't have

He then put his hands back into his

So it was immediately after that that he's sticking

his hands back in his pockets.

Then ycu say "I again tola

him to keep his hands out of his pockets."

Is that the order

that it occurred?
A.

Correct.

When I first started to ask him to put his

hands -- told him to keep his hands out and then asked him
those questions, that's when he put them back in.
Q.

And then you told him to remove his hand one more time

and he was looking around quickly..

Is this what you've

described as him looking for a way out or a way to run?
A.

From my experience when I've had other foot pursuits,

when people start looking around that indicates to me that
they're looking for a way to get around.
Q.

But the delay between the time when you tell him you're

going to give him the warning ticket to the time when he's
running is just a matter of seconds or a minute or two?

Just

a very short time?
A.

A short time.

It's all happening simultaneously.

Q.

Okay.

A.

I know it seems longer in the report, but while I'm

saying, after noticing the tattoo, I think I arrested you in
'94 or '95, do you have anything on you now, do you use drugs
now, that only takes a few seconds to ask those questions.
Q.

And you put your hand on him and then he's gone?

A.

Correct.
MR. BARON:

That's all.
RECROSS-EXAMINATION

BY MR. BOND:
Q.

The earlier time when he got out of his car and came

towards you, did you notice if he had his hands in his
pockets?
A.

No.

He had them out when he initially walked back to me.

I remember watching his hands and face.
girlfriend just stole my truck.

He was upset.

My

He had his hands out of his

pockets to get his license for me because he'd run the stop
sign.

Q.

What aoout the five cr ten minutes where you were cal^~:

dispatch and waiting for backup and all that stuff, did he
cut his hands in his pockets?
A.

He was standing by his car.

door on the passenger side.

I was back behind my car

I don't recall if he had his

hands in his pockets.
Q.

So you weren't even watching him then?

A.

I was watching him, writing the warning and talking to

dispatch.

The initial contact was in reference to a stolen

vehicle, so I didn't fear any threat to my safety.
Q.

So it wasn't until way down, when you started to talk

about the drugs, that's when you started to fear for your
safety?
A.

When he appeared very nervous and kept putting his hand;

back that's when my safety was a concern.
MR. BOND:

All right.

That's all.

MR. BARON:

Nothing further.

THE COURT:

You may step down.

MR. BARON:

We have no further witnesses.

THE COURT:

Mr. Bond, anything further?

MR. BOND:

No.

Are we arguing it?

We rest,

I don't have a:

evidence.
THE COURT:

Okay.

Let me ask if you want to argue

it now or if you want to submit a memorandum?
propose to proceed?

How do you

MR. BARON:

I would just suggest that: we do a quick

argument and have it over with today.

I think the state has

shown specific and articulable facts which reasonably support
the actions of the officer, plus you have the fact that he
never did a frisk.
a frisk done.

We never got to the point where there was

I'm not sure how we can suppress any evidence

that resulted from an illegal frisk.

We got to the point

where a frisk was going to be done, but the defendant chose
to leave at that point.

And for obvious reasons because he

had drugs in his pocket and didn't want them discovered.
We not only have a bulge, but we have lots of other
things here.

We have the defendant upset over something

that's happened; upset at the officer because they're not
going to go and pick up his vehicle.

He's very nervous

because the officer mentions a past drug arrest and he's very
nervous about that.

He keeps putting his hands in his

pockets on several occasions, in spite of the fact that the
officer said don't do that.
I think clearly the officer can do the minimal intrusion
of a frisk to make sure that he's safe while he continues to
talk to this individual and that's what he attempted to do.
One again, we never got that far.

The frisk was never done.

This defendant chose to leave the area, to run from the
officer.

So I don't see any grounds whatsoever to suppress

any evidence based upon the facts that we have here.

Up until this time the officer was responding :: the
concerns of the defendant.
him.

The defendant is there trying to get the officer to

seize his vehicle.
all.

It's not like he was detaining

So he's not detaining the defendant at

If there was a period of detention it was a matter of a

few seconds and then he decides to run.
THE COURT:

Isn't there a detention any time you say

you'll have to wait while I write out the warning ticket?
MR. BARON:

Yeah.

And from that time until the time

he ran the officer said it was 30 seconds, approximately.

Up

until that time they were investigating the stolen vehicle.
We're not talking about a five or ten minute detention on a
traffic citation, such as the cases talk about.

We're

talking about a 30 second possible detention while he brings
out the warning ticket.
intrusion.

It's a very minimal, very minimal

I think the officer had every reason to believe

that he needed to be concerned for his safety and to conduct
the frisk, even though he wasn't able to do it.
THE COURT:
MR. BOND:
that —

That's all.

Go ahead, Mr. Bond.
Well, I think first and importantly is

it's pretty well settled case law that a detention

must be temporary and last no longer than is necessary to
effectuate the purpose of the stop.

And included m

that, is

if there is investigative questioning that detains the driver

reasonable suspicion of more serious criminal activity.
That's exactly what happened in this case.

He's got the

warning ticket in his hand and he's got his license and
registration.

He doesn't give it back to him.

Suddenly he

starts asking him about these previous charges.

He points to

a marijuana tattoo and asks him if he still uses drugs.
says no, I don't.

But he goes on and says —

He

and at this

point he's putting his hand in his pockets, but he's still
saying can I look this your car?
looking in my car.

No, I don't want you

Then he says I want to search you because

I'm concerned for my safety.
That right there is exceeding the scope of that stop.
There is no testimony that there was any criminal activity
before he started asking about those drugs.

Further, there

was no suspicion or fear for the officer's safety before he
started asking about those drugs.
stand.

He stated that on the

That is clearly beyond the scope of this stop.

He

was merely going to give him a violation and he had the
ticket ready to go, and all of a sudden he starts asking
about the drugs.
Then I have some case law that I found that.

One case

says that the trial court noted -- this is State versus
Sykes.
THE COURT:
MR. BOND:

Are these in your memorandum?
Yeah.

Page five.

THE COURT:

?age five.

(Pause in the proceedings.)
MR. BOND:

At the bottom, that last quote, "The

appellate court held that the trial court noted that the
bulge under defendant's clothing at waist level and his
failure to produce identification were inadequate
circumstances for the officers to have formed a reasonable
articulable suspicion."

Just merely a bulge in somebody's

pocket they held wasn't sufficient.
When it comes to the questioning about the prior drug
case, that can't support a reasonable suspicion of probabie
cause as the case

on my last page states.

It says, State

versus Humphrey, it says, "In addition, the fact that an
individual previously has been involved in criminal activity
is not enough.

We recognize that consideration of an

individual's past criminal history is not properly part of a
probable cause determination."

So he asked him about it and

then he starts to get nervous.

He points to the marijuana

tattoo and he keeps going on and on about it.
him leave.

He doesn't let

He has no reason to ask those questions.

Those

investigative questions are beyond the scope of what he saw
at that point.
Further, there's one other case that I didn't put in my
memorandum, but I think you're familiar with these, where

plenty of those cases that say -- I can provide them to the
court.

They have held that there's lots of reasons that

people get nervous when they get pulled over.

It's always a

nervous situation. .'
I think, based on that, there's two things.

One, he

exceeded the scope of the stop by asking those investigative
questions.

That's clearly evident from the case law.

Also,

that bulge in his front pocket is not suspicion -- is not
grounds for officer safety without something more.
So we would submit it on that, Your Honor.

I believe

this is clearly a violation of the defendant's Fourth
Amendment rights.
THE COURT:

Anything further, Mr. Baron?

MR. BARON:

Just a comment.

Counsel takes one

little thing out and says that's not enough.

Then he picks

another little thing out and says that's not enough by
itself.

That's true.

citizen and search him.

You see a bulge, you can't go up to a
But if you see ail of these things,

his demeanor, his extreme nervousness, his looking around as
if he's looking for a way to escape, keeping putting his
hands in his pockets even though told not to, you combine all
of that and, yeah, the bulge isn't enough, but if you have
something in addition to the bulge it's enough.

The

nervousness isn't enough, but if you have something in
addition to the nervousness it's enough.

Counsel wants to go to these individual items, cut AT.er.
you combine those with everything then certainly we have
enough that the officer used reasonable —

he was reasonable

if his reactions to that and in trying to do the frisk at
that point.

It's easy for us to try and second guess him

here today, but we weren't there with this very upset,
nervous individual who appeared to be trying to get something
out of his pocket and appeared like he was going to run.
think it was reasonable.
MR. BOND:

Can I just say one final thing to that?

If the court remembers what the officer said, when the
defendant got out of the car he was looking for that truck.
Apparently that truck was right in the vicinity, because ne
ran that stop sign trying to get his truck back.

So it's

perfectly logical that he's looking around for that truck.
It could still be driving around somewhere.
wanted to see where it went.
to leave to go get her.
where that truck was.

He probably

And he told the officer he naci

It's obvious he was concerned about
It was right in front of him before he

got pulled over.
The second thing about pulling different things cut, I
think it's important to note that none of that stuff -- there
was none of those concerns until after he started asking him
these questions about his prior drug charges and started to
probe about wantina to look in the car.

The ctner important thing is that he sees this culge

m

his pocket and says this may be a weapon, but he never as,<s
the defendant what's in your pocket.
remembers arresting him for drugs.
tattoo on your shoulder.

He says that he
There's a marijuana

He puts his hands in and out of his

pockets and he says can I search your car.
ask what's in your pocket?

Why doesn't he

If he's seeing him with his hands

in his pockets and a bulge, why isn't he asking to check his
pockets?

He asked if he can search the car.

obviously not concern there.

There's

They're trying to stretch this

to make it a concern so they can justify the search.

I'll

submit it on that.
THE COURT:
fairly close case.

The court views this as actually a
As I look at the language that's been

cited by counsel, State versus Sykes, in that case I note,
"The trial court noted that the bulge under the defendant's
clothing at waist level and his failure to produce
identification were inadequate circumstances for the officer
to form a reasonable articulable suspicion."
The distinctions that appear to be in this case are the
following.

There was the bulge actually in the pants pocket,

which by itself wouldn't be an adequate reasonable suspicion.
There was the defendant's demeanor, which was described as
angry, excited, upset.
m

Possibly that wouldn't be sufficient

addition because there's excianation for that.

He

explained why he was upset, what was going on and what he was
agitated about.
But over the course of this encounter that lasted several
minutes, he repeatedly put his hand in the pocket where this
object or bulge was and he was repeatedly told to remove
them.

He did, but then, being aware that the officer didn't

want those hands there, they kept going back there anyway,
which in the court's view would give the officer a
justification for being nervous or uneasy or concerned,
because normally a person, once they've been told by the
officer once or twice don't do that, understands that they're
not supposed to do that, that that's a problem.

In this case

the officer then attempted to do a frisk, but the defendant
broke and ran.
For the foregoing reasons the motion to suppress is
denied, although the court, as I've indicated, it's a close,
case.

The appellate court could look at that and say no, it

is still the Sykes case.

I think this court's view is they'd

look at it and say no, there's the distinctions.
MR. BOND:

May I ask to have it -- it was originally

filed as exceeding the scope.

Can you explain the findings

on that for the record?
THE COURT:

Exceeding the scope?

During the course

of the encounter the officer, whether issuing a traffic
ticket or a warning or anything else, has a right to look out

for his own personal safety.
MR. BOND:

Okay.

THE COURT:

During the course of that encounter,

because of the defendant's actions -- and as I say, I think
this is a close call.

But the fact that it was repeated, and

I donft know how many times, but I have the testimony that
says repeatedly, which means more than one, more than twice,
it means a number of times.
that pocket.

The hand still goes back into

So the court is basing it on a safety issue.

MR. BOND:

All right.

I see.

THE COURT:

Any other questions or matters for

MR. BARON:

No, not for today, Your Honor.

THE COURT:

Do we have this at this point scheduled

today?

for a pretrial conference or is that what we need to do next?
MR. BARON:

I think that's what we need to do next.

I don't have any notes of anything further scheduled.
(Pause in the proceedings.)
THE COURT:

Have counsel had some discussions?

Do

you want to do that right now?
MR. BOND:

Yeah, could we?

We can talk for a

second.
THE COURT:
MR. BOND:
THE COURT:

Do you want a couple of minutes recess?
Yes.
Court'sin recess.

THE BAILIFF:

Court is m

recess.

(Short recess . )
THE COURT:

Counsel, do we need to set a settlement

conference or a trial or where are we at?
(Pause in the proceedings.)
MR. BOND:

I think we've been talking about the bai'.

in this case.
THE COURT:
MR. BOND:
THE COURT:
MR. BOND:
THE COURT:
MR. BOND:
MR. BARON:

Is he being held on any other charges?
No, just this.
Was he initially?
No, just this.
How long has he been in custody?
About 30 days.
What we've been discussing, Your Honor,

if he's willing to plead guilty today to a third degree
felony possession, we've been discussing allowing bail of
$3,000, either a cash or bail bondsman, on the condition tha*
he immediately enroll into an intensive outpatient therapy
program at New Choices and successfully participate in that
while they're doing the presentence report.
I'm not sure that he can get a bail bondsman, frankly,
because he was missing once before.
THE COURT:

Does he have any prospects of family

helping him on that?
MR. BOND:

I'm sorry, did you ask something?

THE COURT:

I ]us: asKea are there any pr:spe::s

that the family might be able to come up with the $3,000
bond?
MR. BOND:

I don't know.

He seems to think he can

make that.
MR. BARON:

That would be conditioned upon him

entering a guilty plea today to the third degree felony.
THE COURT:

I don't have any -- I don't want the

defendant to feel like I'm trying to push him to accept
something or tell him he shouldn't.

I am just inquiring if

there is an agreement or not.
MR. BOND:
THE COURT:

I think we're ready to do that.
All right.

Mr. Bond, why don't we have

you and your client step up to the podium for a minute.
Mr. Nish, we'll go through a number of questions.
ask your attorney some questions and then you.

I'll

I have to

make sure that you understand what you're doing in entering a
guilty plea.
MR. BARON:

Your Honor, may I have the file so I can

make the changes?
THE COURT:

All right.

Has the current charge been

explained to the defendant, or charges?
MR. BOND:

They have.

THE COURT:

Now, is count two to be dismissed?

MR. BARON:

Yes, Your Honor.

That's fine.

THE COURT:

Have you reviewed with the defendant his

constitutional rights as relate to these proceedings?
MR. BOND:

I've asked him about it and he said he

understood about his right to trial and that he'll be giving
up his right to a trial.
THE COURT:
moment.

I'll review the other rights in a

Mr. Nish, do you feel that you understand your

constitutional rights?
MR. NISH:
THE COURT:

Yes, sir.
All right.

Does the attorney -- does

counsel feel that the plea that the defendant is about to
enter is knowing, voluntary and with an understanding of its
consequences?
MR. BOND:
THE COURT:

I believe it is.
Do you know of any reason he should not

accept this agreement under the terms that have been
negotiated?
MR. BOND:
THE COURT:

I do not.
In your opinion, does the defendant

understand the effect and meaning of pleading guilty?
MR. BOND:
THE COURT:

I believe he does.
Mr. Nish, have you understood what we've

said so far today in this hearing?
MR. NISH:
THE COURT:

Yes, sir.
Are you satisfied with your attorney?

MR. NISH:

Yes, sir.

THE COURT:

Do you need more time to talk with him

before we go forward?
MR. NISH:

No, sir.

THE COURT:

Do you intend to plead guilty to the

amended charge, to a third degree felony?
MR. NISH:

Yes, sir.

THE COURT:

Are you presently under the influence of

any alcohol or drugs?
MR. NISH:
THE COURT:

No, sir.
Are you suffering from any physical or

mental illness which would interfere with your ability to
understand things?
MR. NISH:
THE COURT:

No, sir.
Do you understand that you have the

right to plead not guilty?
MR. NISH:
THE COURT:

Yes, sir.
If you plead guilty you have certain

rights which you'll be waiving, including the following.
These are your constitutional rights.

You have the right to

a speedy trial before an impartial jury.

You have the right

to counsel, either appointed for you or retained by you.

You

have the right to confront and cross-examine the state's
witnesses and to present a defense in your own behalf.
have the right against self-incrimination.

You have the

You

right to compel witnesses to appear in court and .testify in
your behalf at no cost to you.

You have the right of

requiring that the state prove your guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt.

If you were convicted following a trial, you would

have the right to appeal the conviction.

If you plead guilty

you waive all of these rights I've just identified.

Do you

understand that?
MR. NISH:
THE COURT:
MR. NISH:
THE COURT:

Yes, sir.
Are you willing to waive those rights?
Yes, sir.
The state would be required to prove

each of the following elements beyond a reasonable doubt.
With regards to count one as amended, that the defendant did
knowingly and intentionally possess or use a controlled
substance, to whit, methamphetamine.

Is that an accurate

statement?
MR. NISH:
THE COURT:

Yes, sir.
Mr'. Baron, I've heard the testimony this

morning, but we didn't hear all of it.

Can you make a brief

summary of the evidence that would be presented at trial?
MR. BARON:

I will, Your Honor.

pulled over for running a stop sign.

The defendant was

Then we heard what

happened with regard to the possible stolen vehicle and the
questioning.

The defendant then ran from the area.

officer pursued him.

The

Without going into all the details, he

finally got to a fence that ne can not climb over.

The

officer saw him do what appeared to be throwing something
over the fence.

He was then sprayed with something like a

Mace spray and taken into custody.
The officer later looked in the area where it appeared ne
had thrown something and found a syringe and a homemade light
bulb used for consuming methamphetamine.

Tests were run and

it was found that these items did in fact have
methamphetamine contained in them.
THE COURT:

That's all.

Is that an accurate summary of what

happened?
MR. NISH:
THE COURT:

(Nodded his head.)
You need to answer out loud because

we're recording today.
MR. NISH:

Yes, sir.

MR. BOND:

Can I ask Roger one thing?

THE COURT:

Yes.

While he's asking I'll explain

that this is a third degree felony as amended.

That means

that it is punishable by a term of zero to five years at tne
Utah State Prison and a fine of up to $5,000.

Do you

understand that?
MR. NISH:
THE COURT:

(Nodded his head.)
We'll wait for counsel here before we

continue.
(Pause in the proceedings.)

MR. BOND:
THE COURT:

All right.

We're ready.

Mr. Nish, you understand that you can

appeal a conviction if you were to plead not guilty, is that
clear to you?
MR. NISH:

Yes, sir.

MR. BOND:

Actually, I've talked to Roger and we've

discussed and agreed that this would be a conditional guilty
plea in case we decide to appeal it.
THE COURT:

All right.

You're preserving the

court's ruling made earlier on the suppression issue?
MR. BOND:

That's correct.

THE COURT:

Is that your agreement, Mr. Baron?

MR. BARON:

It is, Your Honor.

Frankly, I think

this is -- this particular set of facts is something that may
come up again, this type of thing, and I wouldn't mind having
an appellate decision on it anyway.
MR. BOND:

Can I have the minutes reflect that and

can I ask the judgment to reflect that when you do it?
THE COURT:

I think it would be well if that was

included in the judgment.

Then there won't be some confusion

down the road.
MR. BOND:
THE COURT:

All right.
Mr. Nish, do you need any more time to

confer with your attorney?
MR. NISH:

No.

THE COURT:

Ail rignt.

nave

there been any premises

made to you other than what I've been told about here m

~he

courtroom?
MR. NISH:
THE COURT:

No, sir.
You understand that I haven't made any

agreement or any promise as to what the sentence would be, is
that clear to you?
MR. NISH:
THE COURT:

Yes, sir.
Has anyone used any threats, any

intimidation, somehow tried to force you to plead guilty?
MR. NISH:
THE COURT:

No, sir.
Are you pleading guilty because you are

in fact guilty of this charge as amended?
MR. NISH:
THE COURT:

Yes, sir.
Do you have any questions you want to

ask either your attorney or this court before you enter the
plea?
MR. NISH:
THE COURT:

No, sir.
As to the charge in the information as

amended, possession of a controlled substance, a third degree
felony, Tremonton, Utah, July 13th, 2000, how do you plead?
MR. NISH:
THE COURT:

Guilty.
The court will accept the guilty plea.

It appears be freely and voluntarily made with an
understanding of its consequences.

You may seek for gccd

cause shown to withdraw that plea within 30 days from today's
date.

If you don't make such a request within 30 days, you

forfeit that right.
You have the right to be sentenced in not less than two
nor more than 45 days from today's date.
propose sentencing for March 13th.

Counsel, I would

That's actually going to

be 47 days out, so we'd need a waiver in order to do that.
If he doesn't want to waive I'll find an earlier date.
(Pause in the proceedings.)
THE COURT:

Are you willing to waive that 45 day

sentencing requirement?
MR. NISH:

For two days, yeah.

Just a couple of

days extra?
THE COURT:

Yeah.

will be 47 days out.

The way we're scheduling it it

That's why I need the waiver.

Is that

acceptable to you?
MR. NISH:
THE COURT:
13th, 9 a.m.

Yes, sir.
We'll schedule the sentencing for March

I'll direct that Adult Probation prepare a

presentence report.

And if the defendant is released from

custody he needs to understand that it's his responsibility
to go to Adult Probation and Parole immediately and get that
report started.

Cooperate with them and give them any

information they need.
MR. NISH:

So as soon as I get out I go to AP&??

1

THE COURT:

Yes, tnat's the first place you go.

2

Now, if you don't get out they'll come and visit with you

3

down there and get the report done.

4

have to go to them.

5

MR. BARON:

But if you are cut you

According to the agreement, he also has

6

to go to New Choices immediately and sign up for their

7

intensive program there.

8
9

MR. NISH:

If I'm in Cache Valley, in Logan, can I

do my -- I mean, do they have a New Choices over there in

10

Logan or do I have to come clear over back to Brigham to do

11

it?

12
13

THE COURT:
arrested?

14
15

Where were you living before you were

MR. NISH:
arrested.

16

I was living in Tremonton before I was

Now, I believe, I'll be staying in Cache Vaiiey.
THE COURT:

I'll allow the agencies to work that

17

out.

I'll require that you at least begin the process with

18

,ew Choices here and with Adult Probation here.

If they

19

choose to transfer it to their counterpart in Cache Valley,

20

it's okay with me, but you have to have them decide that.

21

MR. NISH:

22

THE COURT:

23

MR. BOND:

So start here in Brigham first?
Right.
Actually, how they work that out, in

24

Cache they give money -- they have money available for

25

inpatient programs.

In Box Eider they don't have that money

They use that money for the outpatient programs.

So they dia

away with the funding for inpatient programs for people who
can't afford it here.

They didn't in Cache, so they don't

have an outpatient intensive program in Cache.
THE COURT:

So he'll probably have to do it all

here, but I won't dictate that.

If there's some way to do it

in Cache I'm not opposed to it.
All right.

The court will accept the terms as proposed.

The defendant may be released pending sentencing upon his
posting a $3,000 bail and upon his complying with an
intensive outpatient drug treatment program.

Any violations

of that program or any failures to participate would be
grounds for revoking the release from custody.
Anything else?
MR. BOND:

now.

No.

MR. BARON:

No, Your Honor.

THE COURT:

Mr. Nish, this gives you an opportunity

Some of this -- a lot of this is up to you.

do well.

Court's in recess.
THE BAILIFF:

Court's in recess.

(Concluded at 12:10 o.m.)

I hope you
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